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any other legal means which a father may adopt, to enforce the
authority which the law for wise purposes has given to him over
his minor children, and that regard for his wishes and counsel in
the more important concerns of their lives after maturity, which
the untrammelled testamentary power conferred by our law is cal-
culated to secure.
I am of opinion that the condition is certain, and is a leg,1M
and valid condition, and makes void the bequests to John, and
that the direction to the executors 'to dispose of the estate as if
John were dead in testator's life gives to the three other children
absolutely both the share of the fund bequeathed to John and his
issue, and that part of testator's property outside of this fund,
which by the law of succession would have gone to John but for
this provision.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.
1
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
2
SUPREM31E COURT OF NEW YORK.8
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF VERMONT. 4'
AMENDMENT.
Presumption as to Tbne of rnaking.-ndependently of any showing
of the day on which an amendment of process is proen:'ed. it will be
taken to have been on the last day of term : Burns v. First Nrationad
Bank of St. Albanas, 45 Vt.
ASSUMPSIT. See Husband and Wife.
Evidence of Promise-Jot Contract.-Johnston. wishing to be ap-
.--vmtcd a sequestrator, employed Mackrell. a lawyer, to conduct the pro-
ceedings in the Common Pleas. The petition was signed by a number
ot others, some of whom spoke to Mackrell and urged him to press the
promeeding. ld, that this was not evidence of a promise on the part
of" the others to pay : Cook et al. v. .lfackrell et al., 70 Pa.
31ackrell declared against seven on a joint contract; there was no.
evidence in relation to three. Held, that the action could not be main-
ahined: Id.
I From J. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 36 Ind. Rep.
2 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 70 Pa. St. Rep.
3 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 64 of his Reports.
4 From J. W. Rowell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 45 Vt. Rep.
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BILLS AND NOTES. See Township Trustee.
Payable to Partnership-Endorsement by any one of the Firm.-
When negotiable paper is rightly taken payable to a partnership, any
member of the partnership has authority to bind the firm by endorsing
it in the firm name to a bond fide purchaser for value in due course of
business, even though, as between the partners, such paper was the
sole property of the partner endorsing it, and the partners had agreed
that no member should endorse paper to make the others liable: Barrett
v. Russell and Flint, 45 Vt. -
CONSTITUTIONAL ILAW.
Legislaive Power. -The power of the legislature is omnipotent,
within constitutional limits. And the good of the greatest number is
regarded by the legislature as its justification for the extraordinary use of
its power: The People v. The New York Gas-Light Company, 64 Barb.
CONTRACT.
Construction of.-A contract provided for the purchase, by the plain-
tiffs, and the sale by the defendant, of 100 bales of cloves, at five cents
per pound, to arrive; "deliverable sound and in good order." On
examining the cloves, after their arrival, part of them proved to be sound,
and a part not sound, or in good order. The plaintiffs offered to receive
the whole invoice-the unsound as well as the sound-and pay there-
for the contract price. The defendant delivered the sound cloves, but
refused to deliver the unsound. The unsound cloves were proven to be
worth only two and a half cents per pound. They were sold at auction,
under the direction of the insurers, and realized three and one quarter
cents per pound. Held, that the plaintiffs could not have been required
to receive the damaged cloves; but that they might waive the objec-
tion that they were unsound, and the vendor must then deliver. That
sound cloves were deliverable, unsound not deliverable: Townsend et al.
v. Shepard, 64 Barb.
That this construction embraced the whole meaning of the words
"deliverable sound and in good order ;" that provision being for the
benefit of the purchasers, and against the seller. But that it was not
a warranty that the cloves should arrive sound and in good order; nor
was it an agreement that the vendor would deliver 100 bales of cloves,
"sound or in good order :" Id.
Held, also, that when the plaintiffs offered to receive the whole invoice,
and pay therefor the price named in the contract, the defendant was
bound to deliver; and his refusal subjected him to the payment of such
damages as the plaintiffs sustained thereby : Id.
But that there was no proof of any damage sustained by the plaintiffs,
by reason of the defendant's refusal to deliver the unsound portion of
the cloves; the price for which they sold, although greater than the
market-value, being less than the plaintiffs were required to pay by the
contract, and less than their offer: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Evidence; Jdr..
Gas Companies-Liability to Indictment for Nuisance.-When the
legislature has authorized a corporation to manufacture gas, to be used
thr lighting streets and buildings in a city, and required that the act
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giving such authority shall be favorably construed in all courts, for the
purposes expressed therein ; and the company has, in pursuance of such
authority, proceeded to erect gas-works, and to make and distribute gas
therafrom, it is not liable to indictment for creating a nuisance, by
unwholesome smells, smokes and stenches, )rendering the air corrupt,
offensive, uncomfortable and unwholesome, in conducting its business;
where it is conceded that the buildings and processes of the company
are of the best, and that it has used due care and diligence in the busi-
ness : The People v. Tke New York Gas-Light Companyj, 64 Barb.
Although it may be that private persons can maintain an action for
damages, yet the people are barred by the act which the legislature has
passed from making a public complaint, by indictment, for such a cause,
while the corporation conducts its business with skill, science and
care: 11.
Defence of House-tan's House his Castle.-The idea embraced in
the expression that a man's house is his castle, is not that it is his pro-
perty, and that, as such, he has the right to defend and protect it by
other and more extreme means than he might lawfully use to defend
and protect his shop, his office, or his barn. The sense in which the
house has a peculiar immunity, is that it is sacred for the protection of
his person and of his family. An assault on the house can be regarded
as an assault on the person only in case the purpose of such assault be
injury to the person of the occupant, or members of his iamily, and in
order to accomplish this, the assailant attacks the castle in order to
reach the inmate. In this view it is said and settled that, in such case,
the inmate need not flee from his house in order to escape injury by the
assailant, but he may meet him at the threslhold, and prevent him from
breaking in by any means rendered necessary by the exigency ; and
upon the same ground and reason that one may defend himself from
peril of life, or great bodily harm, by means fatal to the assailant, if
rendered necessary by the exigency of the assault: State v. Patterson,
45 Vt.
DAMAGES. See M aster and Seerrant.
Fine in a Crminal Suit for same Mattei- Counsel Fees.-The im-
position of a fine in a criminal proceeding for assault and battery will
not bar, or mitigate, the party's liability to exemplary damages in a civil
suit for the same act: Hoadley v. TVritson, 45 Vt.
Such damages are recoverable with the ordinary damages under the
common allegation that the act declared for was done to the damage of
the plaintiff: Id.
The expenses of the plaintiff for counsel fees and other trouble in
the suit, not taxable costs, are not a proper element of exemplary
damages : Id.
Proximate Result of Defendant's Acts.-As a general rule one is
answerable for the consequences of his fault only so far as they are
natural and proximate, and may therefore be foreseen by ordinary fore-
cast : not for those arising from a conjunction of his fault with circum-
stances of an extraordinary nature: Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa.
A man mounted a pile of flagstones in a street to make a public
speech; a crowd of hearers gathered about him, some of whom also got
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on the stones and broke them: Held, it was not a legal conclusion that
the bpeaker was liable for the breaking of the stone by the bystanders:
Id.
It wvas a question for the jury, whether the defendant's making the
speech in the street was the proximate or remote cause of the injury.
Mlaking a speech in a street is notper se a nuisance: Id.
When liquidated.-By an agreement in writing for the sale of land,
it was stipulated that in case the vendor should fail or refuse to execute
and deliver a proper deed of conveyance, at the time and in the manner
agreed, provided the purchaser should be ready to perform the covenants
on his part; or in case the purchaser should fail or refuse to pay, &c.,
on his part, provided the vendor should be ready to deliver such deed;
then that the party so failing should pay to the other party, or his or
their assigns, the sum of $5000; which was thereby declared, fixed and
agreed upon as the liquidated amount of damages to be paid by the
party so failing, for his or their non-performance. Held, that by this
contract, the damages for a breach thereof were liquidated at $5000;
aud that upon the failure of the defendant to execute a proper deed of
conveyance on the day specified, the plaintiff was entitled to recover
that sum: Leggett v. The .Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 64 Barb.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Partnership.
Assignment of Claim.-A trust-mortgage was made to Caldwell to
secure, amongst others, a debt of Hartupee, who owed a firm of which
Caldwell was a partner. Hartupee gave an order on Caldwell in favor
of Cuthbert; on presentation Caldwell refused to pay Cuthbert, saying
he would pay Hartupee's debt to his firm from what he was entitled to
under the mortgage. At the trial Caldwell's partner consented that the
firm's claim might be set off to Hartupee's claim against Caldwell. Held,
that the order was an equitable assignment to Cuthbert, and he might
recover from Caldwell: Caldwell v. Hartupee, 70 Pa.
Vacating Settlement for Fraud or Xistake.-The mistake of one party,
and the fraud of the other, is quite as good cause for vacating the set-
tlement of a claim, as a mutual mistake: JBloodgood, Adm'n., &c., v.
Sears, 64 Barb.
Where a party having a claim against an estate, for services rendered,
was induced to make a settlement of such claim, with the administrator,
by an erroneous statement contained in the inventory of the estate,
whereby a large portion of such estate was suppressed, and the adminis-
trator violated his duty in concealing the part of the estate so suppressed;
H ed, that this was a proper case for vacating the settlement: Id.
DECEIT. See Limitations.
DEED. See Partnership.
Boundaries-A.fonuments and Abuttals govern Courses and Distances.-
A deed described one line of the land thereby conveyed as running
"1 north 34 degrees west, on said K.'s line and C.'s north line, 45 rods
and 16 links, to the bound begun at," which was the line in dispute.
At the time of the execution of said deed, the land of Al., who was the
grantee in said deed, which was contiguous to the land conveyed there-
by, and on the line of which the disputed line was described as running,
VOL. XXI-.26
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extended northerly only to a brook which intersected said last-mentioned
line. On the opposite side of the brook, C.'s land was situated, extending
several rods further north-easterly along the brook than the point where
" said M.'s line" terminated at the brook, so that, if the disputed line
should be continued in the same course across the brook to the place
of beginning, said deed would include a portion of C.'s land lying south
of and adjoining the land of the grantor conveyed by said deed. In
order for the line in question to reach and run on (.'s north line, it
would, at the point where it reached C.'s land at the brook, have to turn
nearly at a right angle, and run north-easterly on his line a few rods, to
the corner of his land, then turn at an acute angle, and run on his north
line in a course, north 67J degrees west. At the time of the execution
of said deed, O.'s north line was marked by a log and slash fence on the
land, and as nearly on the line as such fences usually are. Reld, that
the monuments and abuttals, and not the course, controlled the con-
struction of said deed, and that the land thereby conveyed was bounded
along the line in question by the said lands of M. and C.: Bundy v.
lforgan, 45 Vt.
EJECTMENT. See Vendor.
EQUITY. See Nuisance.
Relief-Damages-Restraint of Tres&pass.-When a court of equity
has jurisdiction, if the relief prayed for cannot be granted, compensation
in damages may be awarded in lieu thereof: Masson and Besanson'A
.Ap)peal, 70 Pa.
Parties agreed to erect a party-wall, each to build a portion specified
one refused and the other erected the whole wall; the former then com-
menced to use the party-wall for his building; the other bronight a bill
to restrain him; pending the dispute, they agreed that the defendant
might go on with his building, giving bonds for such sum as might be
adjudged to the plaintiff, and the injunction was therefore withheld.
Hel, That as the specific relief asked, therefore, could not be granted,
the court, " both inherently and by virtue of the agreement," had power
to ascertain and award compensation : Id.
The plaintiff having finished the wall under the agreement, it was his
own until paid for, and the threatened act of defendant of breaking into
the wall might be restrained: Id.
Equity will restrain a trespass of a permanent nature; an action for
damages in such case not being an adequate remedy, as in case of a tem-
porary trespass : Id.
EVIDENCE.
Proof of Agreement- Written and Parol Evidence -The rule, as to
the admissibility of parol evidence to vary written agreements, does not
touch the validity of the agreement sought to be proved, but only the
kind of evidence by which the party may be compelled to prove it; and
if the agreement is admitted on trial, or by the pleadings, or is proved
without objection by parol evidence, it is a waiver of the rule, and
becomes the agreement as fully operative as if it had been proved by a
writing: Davis v. Goodrich, 45 Vt.
Dying Declarations.-It is not necessary in order to make dying
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declarations admissible in evidence, that the declarant should statc every-
thing constituting the res gestm of the subject of his statement, but only
that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all
that he intended to say as concerning his meaning as to such fact:
FState v. Patterson, 45 Vt.
Illegal.-The admission of illegal testimony, by a referee, will not
warrant a reversal of the referee's decision, where there is sufficient evi-
dence, without such testimony, to sustain the judgment; the error of
the referee, if any, in admitting the illegal testimony, in such a case,
not being injurious to the unsuccessful party: .Fabbri et al. v. The ier-
cantile Mutual Ins. Co., 64 Barb.
As to Value.-It is not necessary that a witness, in speaking of value,
should only speak from actual observation. Where, from the destruction
of property, no witness can be produced who has had an opportunity to
examine and be conversant with the value, the rule which allows the
next best evidence to be produced, applies; and the value may be ascer-
tained from persons conversant with property of that nature, after they
are made acquainted with its condition by the testimony of others: Orr
v. The Mayor, &c., of New York, 64 Barb.
HOMESTEAD.
Under the statutes of this state, the homestead of a debtor is exempt
from attachment upon debts contracted after the filing of the deed
thereof in the town clerk's office, and before the occupation of the
premises by the debtor as a homestead, when he is in such occupancy at
the time of the attachment: Lamb v. Mason, 45 Vt.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Witness.
ilarried Woman-Revocation of Will by .Marriage.-The rule that
th-. marriage of a woman revoked a will made by her before marriage,
rested for its reason on the fact that, by virtue of the husband's marital
rights, the woman, becoming covert, became thereby disabled to dispose
of the property named in the will, the will ceased to be ambulatory:
.Aorton et al. v. Onion, Ex. 45 Vt.
Hence, where afeme sole made a will, and married, and a consider-
able portion of the property disposed of by the will remained in her
unaffected upon her death by any marital rights of her surviving hus.
band, it was held, that the will was entitled to be probated: Id.
Wife may recover Money on her Contract to release Dower-A pur-
chaser agreed to pay a wife 8500 if she would execute a deed for land
sold by her husband; she executed the deed. Held, that she could
recover the money from the purchaser: McAboy v. Johns, 70 Pa.
The contract between the purchaser and the wife was that he was to
give her a writing for the payment of the money. He gave her a paper
which she could not read and represented that it contained the contract;
she thereupon executed the deed. The paper did not contain the verbal
agreement. Held, that she might recover on the verbal promise: Id.
INFANT.
Guardiman's Sale-Judgment-Sale on Execution.-Where, upon the
petition of his guardian, the court, on the 15th day of February 1868,
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ordered the sale under a judgment of the land of a minor, and A.
recovered a judgment against the minor on the 19th day of February
1868, and purchased the land at sheriff's sale on the 11th day of April
following; and seventeen days later B. purchased the land from the
guardian, paying one-half tle purchase-nmonoy and securing the remain-
dcr in one year, and the court approved the sale at the May Term 1868.
hTeld, that the title to the property was in A: Shaffier, Adrn'r, v.
Brqgs and Another, 36 Ind.
Ikld, also, that the order for the sale of the land did not operate in
przesenti, and convert the land into assets in the hands of the guardian
so as to prevent the judgment from operating as a lien on the land ; nor
did the title of the purchaser at a guardian's sale relate back to the
order of sale, so as to prevent any intervening liens or rights being
acquired: Id.
The lands of an infant may be sold on execution against him: Id.
JURY.
Commu ication with after Retirement-Stattcs.-It is error for the
court to have any communication with the jury after a case has been
submitted to them, and while they have it under consideration, except
in open court: State v. Patterson, 45 Vt.
It is also error for the court to furnish the jury a copy of the statutes
of the state while they are out of court deliberating upon their verdict,
that they may read certain provisions, designated by the court, touching
the case under consideration : Id.
LIMITATION, STATUTE OF.
Agent-Mlisrepresentation--Concealment.-An action was brought in
1870 by A. against B., the complaint alleging that B. had, in the year
1848, falsely represented himself to A. as the agent of C., to whom A.
was indebted on a promissory note, and as such agent had received from
A. the money due 0. and promised to pay tle same to C. and take up
and destroy the note; but that B. had retained the money himself, and
A. had only discovered the fact about the time of the bringiog of the
suit; and B. in answer pleaded the Statute of Limitations, to which A.
replied, that he paid the money to B. on his claim that he was the agent
of C., and believing him to be such agent and authorized to receive the
same, when in fact he was not such agent nor had such authority, but
concealed such fact from A. and promised to pay the same over as such
agent, which he failed to do, and by reason of such concealment A. did
not discover the cause of action until in the fall of 1869. H1ehl, that
the reply was insufficient to avoid the otatute ; that the concealment
was all previous to the accruing of the cause of action, and something
more is required to avoid the statute than mere bilence after the action
accrues : Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Liability of Master for wilful Acts of Servant-Conductor.-A boy
riding on a car was wilfully and wantonly struck by the driver, and
thereby thrown off the car ; the car-wheel passed over him: flehl, in a
suit against the car-owners; 1. That they were nor liable for the act
of the driver in striking the boy. 2. They were liable ibr negligently
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iriving over him: P., A. and M. Passenger Railway Co. v. Donahue,
70 Pa.
A master is liable for the results for the wilful conduct of his servant
if within the scope of his authority : Id.
A blow may be given by a conductor or driver when by resistance to
proper authority it becomes necessary: Id.
The court charged that the jury "would be justified in giving the
plaintiff compensation, not only for such damages as he had already
sustained, also such as will reasonably sustain in the future arising from
the injury complained of, but also allow him for any pain and suffering
he has sustained by the injury." Held, to be correct: Id.
That damages for negligence are to be measured by the same rule to
artificial persons as to natural persons, should be held by courts and
juries, and care should be taken by judges trying the causes that it be
so administered: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Master and Servant.
NUISANCE.
Brickburrning-Restraint of lawful Business by Injunction.-Brick-
making being a useful and necessary business, and necessarily exercised
near towns, the burning of bricks, an essential part of the business, is not
a nuisance per se: Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa.
Although an useful employment may produce discomfort or injury
to those near to it., it does not follow that it should be restrained : Id.
The aid of a court of equity is not of right but of grace; to be
extended only where its exercise is certainly just, wise and proper: Id.
In a question of restraining a lawful business, a court of equity will
consider the customs of the people, the characteristics of their business,
the common uses of property and the peculiar circumstances of the
place : Id.
In this case an injunction against a brick-kiln as injuring a vineyara
and residence was refused : Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Bills.
Deed-Treatment of Real Ectate as held in Common or in Partner-
shii.-A deed to persons as tenants in common, who are partners, must,
as to purchasers of the title and creditors having liens on it, stand as
the foundation of their rights and govern in,'distributing the proceeds
of a sale of the title: Ebbert's Appeal, 
70 Pa.
As to creditors, the effect of such deed cannot be changed by parol
evidence, and the land converted into ptrtnership assets, so as to affect
the liens of otherwise preferred creditors: Id.
As between the partners, a trust may result to the firm and the
proceeds of the land be assets of the partnerahip, when they so treated
the title and paid for it from partnership funds: Rd.
Partners can direct the application of the irm funds, and secure
their identity in the kind of title they take for them: Id.
If they take the title as tenants in common, they give character to
the title as to those who afterwards deal with them: Id.
Upon a purchase by B. & K. from the plaintiffs of geods for a pro.
posed new firm of B. & Co., B. & 1. represented that B. was to be a
mfimber of said firm in about six weeks; whereupon the goods were sold
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to B. & M., and the note of B. & Co. taken, for the amount. Such
partnership was never in fhet formed, but no notice of that fact was given
to the plaintiffs, until after the delivery of the goods and the receipt of
the note. Held, that these facts established a legal liability on the part
of M. That although the agreement was that the partnership should
not commence until a future day, and the agreement was never carried
out, yet the purchase itself was a quasi partnership transaction ; and it
having been expressly sanctioned by M., that he was estopped from dis-
puting his liability : Stiles et al. v. Meyer, impleaded, &c., 64 Barb.
PLEADING.
Arrest of Judgrnct-Estoppel.-Where the error alleged is in arrest-
ing judgment, the Supreme Court will not look to the testimony for
aid in pronouncing on the judgment of the court below : Aronson v.
01. and P. Railroad Co., 70 Pa.
If the declaration be sound, the plaintiff is generally entitled to judg-
went: 11.
A declaration was against defendants for loss of goods as carriers:
after verdict it was to be presumed that this was made out: 11.
In another action for the loss of the same goods against the defend-
ants as warehousemen, the plaintiff would be estopped by his allegation
that they were carriers: Id.
RAILROAD. See .Master and Servant.
RECEIVER.
Sit against .Assgnee-Statute.-Action by a receiver against the
assignee, under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, of a judgment
debtor, to recover damages resulting to a judgment-creditor for the fail-
ure of the assignee to properly discharge his duty under the trus.
11ad, that the action could only be sustained at the suit of the party
iijured, or his assigns : La Follett v. Akin, 86 Ind.
flcld, also, that the 205th section of the code (2 G. & IT. 153) only
authorizes the court to empower the receiver to bring suit where the
p.arty whose effects he receives could have brought the action, save, per-
hmaps, in exceptional cases : Id.
SALE. See Tendor.
Conditional Sale-Rescission- Tender of Certiicate.--George sold
stock to Braden, and agreed that lie would take it back and return the
price if requested, and delivered a certificate. h1eld, that Braden could
recover the price without tendering the certificate but that he must
burrender the certificate to George or file it in court, before execution
could issue : George v. Braden, 70 Pa.
TOWNSHIP TRUSTEE.
Title to Money in his Hands.-A township trustee is not a mere bailee
of the money that comes into his hands by virtue of his office. lie is
liable to account for and pay it over, whether the same be stolen or
burned without his fault or loaned out. The legal technical title to the
money in his hands is in himself : Rock and Another v. Stinger, 86 Ind.
Promissory Note.-In an action upon a promissory note, an answer
tuat the money forming the consideration for the note was township and
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school money, coming into the hands of the plaintiff by virtue of his
office as township trustee, and unlawfully loaned by him to the defend-
ants, and that since said loan the plaintiff had vacated his office, consti-
tuted no defence to the suit: Id.
TRESPASS. See Equity.
TRUST.
Resulting Trust-fortgage-ferer.-Where a third party pays the
purchase-money to the grantor for the grantee of lands at the time of the
conveyance, upon a parol agreement, without fraudulent intent, with the
grantee, that the grantee shall hold the land in trust, as security for the
payment of such money to such third party, a resulting trust arises in
favor of such third party and against the assignee of a prior judgment
who is the purchaser of said land at sheriff's sale on execution issued
upon said judgment rendered prior to the said conveyance and payment
of money, who has full knowledge of the said agreement and payment
of money. But if, after said payment by said third party and the agree-
ment between him and the grantee, said third party receives the note
of the grantee, and a mortgage on said land, as security for the pur-
chase-money so paid by said third party, he thereby converts the
equitable estate he held in the land, not into an express trust, but into
a mere debt secured by mortgage, and subject to the lien of the prior
judgment: Milliken and Others v. Ham, 36 Ind.
A resulting or implied trust cannot be created or reserved by parol : Id.
A mortgage takes effect from the time of its delivery: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Lease with Stipulation of Right to Purchase-Assignment of Leas&
-A lease contained a stipulation that the lessee at the end of the time
might have a conveyance of the premises at a specified price; he assigned
the lease; held, that the assignee was entitled to a conveyance : Napier
v. Darlington, 70 Pa.
Such stipulation is not merely a personal covenant but a right, which
may be transferred to his vendee, and enforced at his election, as if the
contract had been absolute : Id.
The stipulation was a continuing offer to sell, and when accepted by
the lessee, a contract of sale was completed: Id.
In an ejectment, the plaintiffs recovered a verdict to be released on
the defendant paying into court the sum found as purchase-money cf
the whole tract, to be taken out by the plaintiffs on their filing a deed
to the defendant of the premises. The defendant paid in the sum, and
the plaintiffs filed a deed purporting to convey the whole tract. It being
ascertained that the plaintiffs were the owners but of f, the defendant
was allowed to take out * of the money paid in, and the plaintiffs to file
a deed conveying but : d.
Warranty of Land-Opening of ighway not an Ewi'ction.-When
land is sold with general warranty, the opening of a public highway in
virtue of eminent domain, is not an eviction which will entitle the vendee
to maintain an action for breach of the covenant: Peck et al. v. Jones,
70 Pa.
A defect or encumbrance not known to the vendee when he accepts
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the deed, is a defence to a bond for purchase-money, although there be
a general warranty : i'd.
Knowledge or ignorance of an encumbrance, or of a defect not appeal.
ing on the thee of the title, is immaterial : i.
In an action on an agreement of sale, the vendee cannot defalk front
the purchase-money on account of a public road upon land which the
owner covenanted to sell and convey: Id.
Title- C9renant to convey free from .Encumbranes.-The defendant,
by a written contract, agreed to sell to the plaintiff, for $15,000, certain
premises which it had purchased at a foreclosure sale; and that on a
day named, upon receiving from the plaintiff $5000 and a bond and
mortgage for the balance of the purchase-nioncy, it would execute and
deliver to him or his assigns, a proper deed of conveyance of the pre-
mises, "free from all encumbrances." On the day of performance, the
plaintiff offered to perform on his part, and the defendant tendered a
deed. But it appearing that prior to the foreclosure of the mortgage
under which the defendant claimed to have acquired title, the mortgagor
had died, leaving a will, by which he devised the mortgaged premises
to certain of his children for life, with remainder to his grandchildren,
and that such grandchildren were not made parties to the foreclosure
suit, the plaintiff refused to accept a conveyance.
Held, 1. That the grandchildren of the mortgagor had an interest, as
remaindermen, in every portion of his estate, capable of being ascer-
tained whenever the prior estate should terminate.
2. That the trustees under the will did not, and could not, represent
such future estate of the grandchildren, at the date of the foreclosure
suit.
3. That although such interest might have been foreclosed, by mak-
ing the grandchildren parties to the foreclosure suit, yet as they were
not parties to the action, their right to assert their title, at the proper
time, remained outstanding.
4. That the insolvency of the estate of the mortgagor did not affect
the question.
5. That the title which the defendant contracted to convey was not
free and clear of all encumbrance, and the plaintiff rightfully refused to
accept the deed: Leggett v. The .ftMtual Life Is. Co. of _hew lork, 64
Barb.
WILL. See Husband and P ife.
WITNESS.
Husband and If ife.-At common law, where the husband was ex.
cluded as a witness on the ground of interest, the wife was also excluded.
The statute has not changed the rule that hlusbaud and wife are incom-
pent witnesses for or against each other. Where the husband is made
a party to answer to an assignment by hint of a cause of action to the
plaintiff, and the assignment is not questioned, the wife may testify as
to other matters ; but where the husband has a pecuniary interest in the
result of the action, she cannot be a witness : Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind.
Interest, or bias, although they may be taken into consideration in
weighing the value of evidence, do not disqualify a witness: Arend v
The Liverp~ool, New York, &c., Steamship Company, 64 Barb.
